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Introduction 
The dramatic political and economic changes that took place in Russia following the col- 
lapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the weakness of state institutions and a general 
retreat of government, sharp social inequalities, escalating crime rates, ﬂourishing organ- 
ised crime, pervasive corruption, and lawlessness. In the meantime, the Russian police 
(until 1 March 2011 known as the ‘militsiya’ but now renamed the ‘politsiya’) was left in a 
fragile and disorganised state (Beck & Robertson, 2005, 2009a, 2009b; Galeotti, 2010; 
Gilinskiy, 2000; Gudkov, Dubin, & Leonova, 2004; Safronov, 2003; Shelley, 1996). Con- 
ditions were created for stimulating and intensifying its misdeeds (in particular, low pay, 
high staff turnover, poor accountability, inadequate training, insufﬁcient funding, and a 
lack of the tradition of respect for human rights). Numerous attempts have been made at 
reforming and revitalising the institution, however, they failed to produce tangible results. 
The most recent reforms were initiated by President Medvedev in December 2009, and it 
remains to be seen how effective they will be in resolving the crisis in the militsiya. 
However, sceptics argue that the reforms are superﬁcial and doubt their potential. 
There is plentiful evidence of militsiya violations of human rights, corruption, and 
involvement in crime, including organised crime and the merger with criminal gangs 
(Amnesty International, 2003, 2008; Glikin, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Khinstein, 
2005). One example is a widely known scandal involving a group of high-ranking militsiya- men 
from the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department that became known as the case of 
‘werewolves in epaulettes’. In the late 1990s, these militsiyamen created a criminal orga- 
nisation that for a number of years engaged in blackmail and racketeering of businessmen, 
trading in ﬁrearms, falsifying evidence, fabricating cases, and committing other crimes. 
Abundant media reports indicate that the case of ‘werewolves in epaulettes’ is far from 
being unique: corrupt and criminal behaviour by militsiya is a daily theme in the media in 
post-Soviet Russia. Among recent well-publicised wrongdoings by the militsiya was a 
shooting spree in April 2009 by a drunken militsiya chief Major Denis Yevsyukov in a Mos- 
cow supermarket. Later that year another incident involving militsiya attracted a lot of atten- 
 
 
 
 
tion when a senior militsiyaman, Major Alexei Dymovsky, posted an appeal to Prime Minis- ter 
Putin on YouTube in which he claimed that corruption within the institution was ende- mic 
and accused his superiors of fabricating criminal cases and framing innocent people. 
According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Internal Security Service, in 
2009 militsiya ofﬁcers committed over 5000 criminal offences (which is 11% more than the 
year before). Three thousand of these offences involved corruption and abuse of 
power.  In  the  same  year  militsiya  violated  laws  and  duty  regulations  approximately 
100,000  times  (which  is  a  17%  increase  compared  to  the  previous  year)  (BBC,  25 
January 2010). Of course, the number of crimes and violations committed by militsiya 
that are not reﬂected in the ofﬁcial statistics is anyone’s guess. Yet, irrespective of the 
statistics, it is common knowledge in Russia that brutality, corruption, extortion, black- 
mail, and other unlawful and unethical behaviour by militsiya happen on a massive scale.  
It is also widely accepted that militsiya ofﬁcers are inefﬁcient, professionally inept, and 
cannot be relied on for protection against crime. As a result, public opinion polls have 
consistently demonstrated a very low level of trust towards the militsiya (Gerber & 
Mendelson,  2008;  Gryaznova,  2005;  Gudkov  &  Dubin,  2005;  Gudkov  et  al.,  2004; 
Mel’nik, 2001; Nevirko, Shinkevich, & Gorbach, 2006; Obschestvennyi Verdikt, 2009). For 
example, Gudkov and Dubin (2005) report that in a sample of 1600 respondents only 12% 
fully trust the militsiya and 40% fully distrust the institution, with the rest express- ing 
partial trust. Gerber and Mendelson (2008) found that in a survey of 11,202 respon- dents, 
only 3% believe that the militsiya ‘fully’ deserve trust, 23% say they ‘probably’ 
deserve trust, 36% say ‘probably not,’ and 29% say ‘not at all’. 
Given the low levels of trust towards the militsiya, a question arises: how does it 
affect the everyday lives of millions of ordinary Russians? This question becomes partic- 
ularly important in the light of the crime wave that has been sweeping the country since 
the early 1990s (Gilinskiy, 1998, 2006; Kuznetsova & Luneev, 2005; Pridemore, 2003, 
2007; Shvarts, 2003). Coping techniques by citizens in a country with high crime rates 
where a large proportion of the population believe that the police can hardly be relied on 
for protection will be the focus of this paper. Based on the ﬁndings derived from an 
empirical study it will discuss some of the adaptive strategies developed by Russians and 
their social implications. 
 
The empirical study 
The empirical study was conducted by the author in the summers of 2007 and 2009 in 
Moscow and a provincial town in central Russia that will not be identiﬁed to ensure con- 
ﬁdentiality of respondents. The research sites were selected primarily for reasons of con- 
venience (the author has personal connections to both). Choosing Moscow and a 
provincial town had an additional advantage: it could make the sample of respondents 
more representative because Moscow is very different from the rest of Russia. 
The study aimed at investigating three broad questions: 
 
(1) How do members of the public interpret their encounters with the militsiya in 
today’s Russia? 
(2) How  do  they  perceive  the  militsiya  on  the  basis  of  their  encounters  with  its 
ofﬁcers? 
(3) How do citizens’ attitudes towards the militsiya affect their everyday behaviour? 
 
Findings related to the ﬁrst two questions have been discussed elsewhere (Zernova, in 
press), and this paper deals speciﬁcally with the third question. 
 
 
The primary research method was in-depth qualitative interviews. Fifty-four members of 
the public were interviewed. They were people who had had encounters with militsiya in the 
post-Soviet period as crime suspects, victims, or witnesses. Respondents were selected using 
purposive sampling. The sample consisted of 22 men and 32 women; 39 interviewees were 
employed (8 of whom were self-employed), 9 retired, and 6 unemployed. Fourteen 
respondents were between the ages of 18 and 30; 20 respondents between 31 and 50; 20 
were above 51. Ten respondents had school diplomas as the highest educational qualiﬁca- 
tion, 17 had college degrees, and 27 had university degrees. Seven respondents described 
their income as high, 26 as average, and 21 as low. Fifty interviewees were ethnic Russians (or 
mixed East Slavs) and four came from former Southern Soviet republics. 
In addition, 10 militsiyamen were interviewed. Six of them were senior ofﬁcers and 
four were from the lower ranks. The author made several attempts to get ofﬁcial permis- 
sion to interview militsiya ofﬁcers, however, they were unsuccessful. Therefore, she had to 
rely on informal connections initially and then used the snowballing technique. 
In interviews militsiyamen were invited to discuss the relationship between militsiya and 
members of the public in today’s Russia. Members of the public were asked to 
describe their encounters with militsiya (as suspects, crime victims, or witnesses) in the 
post-Soviet period. They were also asked to express their attitudes towards the militsiya in the 
light of their experiences. Questions for both, members of the public and militsiya, were 
open-ended, designed to enable the respondents to express views in their own words. 
Discussions were ﬂexible and respondents could choose the direction of the interviews. 
Some interviews with militsiya happened in their ofﬁces, but others occurred in less 
formal settings (such as a park or a beach). The interviews with members of the public 
took place in informal surroundings (usually homes of interviewees or homes of people 
who put the author in touch with interviewees). 
The study uncovered plentiful evidence of unlawful and unethical behaviour by militsiya 
ofﬁcers. Members of the public in the author’s sample saw militsiya as ineffective, corrupt, 
brutal, disrespectful towards the law, concerned primarily with personal enrichment, and 
regularly consorting with criminal groups. Interviewees argued that militsiya cannot be 
trusted and many felt that coming into any contact with them is unsafe. Indeed, militsiya 
were frequently equated to robbers and bandits, and little distinction was made between the 
militsiya and criminal gangs (see Zernova, in press, for a discussion of these ﬁndings). 
When interviewees expressed deep distrust towards, and fear of, militsiya, the author 
questioned them further, attempting to ﬁnd out how these attitudes impacted their everyday 
behaviour. If people living in a high crime country perceive the police as an essentially 
criminal organisation, how do they protect themselves from crime and how do they respond to 
crime once it occurs? Would they still use the services of the militsiya? If yes, what pre- 
cautions would be taken in the process? If no, what alternative solutions could be found? 
It is important to note that the sample of interviewees in this study was rather small, so 
the ﬁndings should not be interpreted as necessarily reﬂecting the attitudes and behaviour of 
the general Russian population. Yet, by gaining insight into some adaptive techniques that 
enable Russians to get by, the ﬁndings may help to highlight some of the implications and 
dangers resulting from the loss of police credibility among citizens. Thus, they may provide 
general lessons applicable both within and beyond the Russian context. 
 
 
Reporting crimes? 
There is evidence indicating reluctance of many members of the public in contemporary 
Russia to report criminal incidents to militsiya (Gilinskiy, 2005; Gudkov, 2000; Mazaev, 
 
 
1997; Pustintsev, 2000, p. 81). When interviewees in the author’s study were asked whether 
they would contact militsiya if they become crime victims, opinions were divided. In the 
sample of 54 respondents, 6 were adamant in their refusal to employ the services of 
militsiya. To quote one of them, ‘militsiya will never ﬁnd the criminal, and in the worst case 
they will put an innocent person in prison’. Another interviewee, intimi- dated by her 
neighbours, drug dealers, commented: ‘I can’t complain to militsiya, because they are most 
certainly associated with the drug dealers. It’s easier for me to move house’. All of these 
six respondents have had some prior encounters with militsiya themselves, or their family 
members have had such encounters. These typically involved extortion, brutality, or other 
abuses of power by militsiya, which resulted in very negative attitudes towards the institution 
on the part of these respondents. 
However, previous negative experiences involving militsiya do not necessarily destroy the 
willingness of some citizens to use their services. Despite being subjected to wrong- doings 
by militsiya in the past, 14 respondents said that they would ask militsiya for assistance. 
These respondents did not appear to have much faith in the ability of militsiya to help them 
solve their problems, however, they could not think of any alternatives. As one interviewee 
explained, ‘I’ll go to the militsiya because there is nowhere else to go’. 
The view of the majority (34 interviewees) was that contacting militsiya should be 
avoided whenever possible, however, sometimes there may be no choice. This attitude is 
reﬂected in the following interview quote: 
 
I do my best not to go to the militsiya. But if a matter is serious, you call the militsiya 
because you have to register it, but they won’t help you in any way. But to go there with 
minor problems is a waste of time. 
 
Given the reluctance by the majority of respondents to use the services of the mili- 
tsiya, what do they do instead? 
 
Coping techniques 
Taking charge of their own safety 
In the 1990s, Russians experienced an increased fear of crime.1 After the fall of commu- 
nism, many had personal experiences of becoming crime victims, and many heard rumours 
of gang activities, violent clashes between mobs, organised crime, serial killers, contract 
killings, armed robbery, drug-related crime, and so on. In addition, probably to some 
extent the increased fear was triggered by the changes in media reports. The move from 
state-controlled media (with its propaganda and routine cover-up of crime) to mar- ket-
driven media (with its regular expositions of high levels of crime) fuelled mass feel- ings of 
anxiety and insecurity (Los, 2002). The press also became ﬁlled with stories about 
militsiya corruption, brutality, collaborations with criminals and mergers with organised 
criminal groups, falsiﬁcation of evidence, fabrication of criminal cases or their closures for 
a payment. No doubt such reports aggravated citizens’ perception that the country was 
sliding into anarchy, triggering changes in their attitudes and behaviour. 
Interviewees in this study reported that people in the post-Soviet period became more 
vigilant and less gullible; they tried to avoid potentially dangerous situations, and did the 
best they could to avoid becoming crime victims. Speciﬁcally, most emphasised the 
importance of securing their ﬂats and houses by installing better locks, stronger doors, 
and bars on the windows; making sure that there is always somebody in the house; not 
opening the door  to strangers.  Interviewees reported  avoiding  walking alone  in dark 
 
 
streets, entering lifts with strangers, and using staircases that are not properly lit. Many 
women carry gas sprays for personal defence. Learning self-defence methods also seems to 
be popular. Several interviewees even acquired guns to defend themselves. 
Wealthy interviewees said that they used private security ﬁrms to guard their persons, 
properties, and businesses. Private security companies have proliferated in Russia since the 
early 1990s (Volkov, 2000, 2002). Their services are not cheap, but those who used them 
said in interviews that they were satisﬁed with the quality of protection. One businessman 
said that he paid militsiya to protect his business.2 Both of these options – purchasing pro- 
tection from private security ﬁrms and using privately sold state protection – are examples of 
legal protection available to individuals and businesses. There is, however, an alterna- tive: 
protection by organised criminal groups (which will be discussed below). 
Those who cannot afford to pay militsiya or private security ﬁrms for protection have to 
be more creative. Dacha and garage owners in the author’s sample described various 
arrangements they used to guard their properties that often involved a great deal of self- 
organising and drawing on whatever resources they have available. 
The crime prevention techniques listed by respondents indicate the attitude of self- 
reliance on their part. However, while self-sufﬁciency is certainly a valuable skill to 
acquire, the pathological state of the militsiya has led to signiﬁcant costs to individuals 
who have to invest more time, money, and energy into crime prevention than they probably 
would have done, had militsiya performed their functions better. 
Another problem with the existing situation is the inequality in the level of protection 
achieved through the self-help methods described above. People who can afford private 
guards or can pay militsiya for protection clearly have an easier time than those who can- 
not. This problem is aggravated by sharp economic divisions in contemporary Russia. 
Yet another problem caused by the militsiya not working as it is supposed to and peo- 
ple resorting to self-help to protect themselves has been highlighted by interviewees. 
Some of the measures originally taken for personal protection – acquisition of guns in 
particular – have been used for offensive purposes. 
 
 
Self-defence against militsiya harassment 
Contemporary Russians have to exercise vigilance in protecting themselves not only from 
ordinary criminals, but also from what a number of interviewees referred to as ‘werewolves in 
epaulettes’.3 This study has found that various self-defence techniques are utilised by cit- izens 
during encounters with militsiya in an attempt to escape harassment and abuse. 
Respondents argued that an obvious way to prevent victimisation by militsiya is to 
avoid encounters with them whenever possible,4 whether it involves crossing the street 
when a citizen sees militsiya walking towards him or her, or whether it means a refusal to 
report a crime. If, however, an encounter is inevitable (for example, if militsiya have 
stopped a person), the immediate strategy that most respondents claimed to be useful is to 
adopt a calm, polite, and obedient demeanour. Those who were rude and deﬁant in their 
communications with militsiya in most cases have found the tactic ineffective and 
provoking negative outcomes. 
Speciﬁc recommendations were given by respondents for migrant workers from for- 
mer Soviet republics, who are numerous in Moscow.5 Many of them are easily identiﬁ- able 
by their non-Slavic appearance. They are frequently stopped and deprived of some of their 
earnings by militsiya, and this is particularly common in the Moscow under- ground.6 
The best solution to their problems, which has been suggested by interviewees, is to 
legalise their status by bribing militsiya and buying a propiska.7  If, however, one 
 
 
does not have the right documents, these people are advised to avoid using the under- 
ground if possible. In any event, they should look conﬁdent, clean, neat, and dress so as to 
not stand out in the crowd. This included dying hair blonde because, in the words of an 
interviewee, ‘militsiya pester the light-coloured less’. Wearing glasses, carrying a newspaper or 
a magazine, or being accompanied by a girlfriend (if one is a man) also may be useful 
strategies for avoiding militsiya harassment. 
The need to protect oneself against militsiya was on several occasions equated in inter- 
views with the need to protect oneself from criminals. Similar tactics were proposed by 
some respondents when dealing with street robbers or militsiya trying to arrest a person: 
run, or, if you cannot, shout as loud as you can. The idea is to attract the attention of pass- 
ers-by in the hope that militsiya will hesitate using excessive violence in their presence. 
It is also very important to be vigilant during searches by militsiya. Several intervie- 
wees shared stories of militsiya planting drugs to incriminate people (with a view of either 
extorting bribes or meeting quotas of arrests). Therefore, it was repeatedly emphasised that a 
person who – or whose car or house – is being searched must keep an eye on their pock- ets 
and possessions and ensure that militsiya do not place anything illegal in them. 
The examples provided above illustrate a variety of strategies and practices that have 
evolved to avoid or reduce victimisation by militsiya. The perceived or actual necessity to 
use such strategies no doubt kills what is left of the respect towards militsiya by mem- bers 
of the public. 
 
 
Bribing militsiya 
A powerful tool utilised by citizens confronted with failure of the militsiya is bribery. 
Forty-four out of 54 members of the public in this study admitted bribing militsiya them- 
selves or by their family members in circumstances ranging from giving a small bribe to 
trafﬁc militsiya for a minor violation to a case where a sizeable bribe enabled a motorist to 
get away with killing a pedestrian. Most examples involved bribing militsiya to avoid arrests 
and detentions, or prevent an offence from being registered. 
While respondents almost universally viewed militsiya as ineffective and typically 
unwilling to help citizens, they pointed out that a bribe may have a positive effect on the 
ability of militsiya to perform their tasks. Multiple examples were provided where inter- 
viewees or their relatives had bribed militsiya to ensure timely or accelerated processing of 
various documents that militsiya are in charge of processing (such as passports or 
driving licences). 
Not only can bribes help to speed up slow procedures and obtain papers one is entitled 
to more quickly, but also they can be used for more sinister purposes. In particular, illus- 
trations were offered by interviewees when bribes helped to acquire fake documents, such as 
bogus driving licences and inspection documents on one’s car conﬁrming that the car is in a 
road-worthy condition when it is not. The availability of such fake documents through 
bribing militsiya means that potentially dangerous drivers and vehicles are on the road.8 
 
Acquiring an ‘insurance’ from militsiya 
When it comes to obtaining desirable results in dealing with the militsiya, another tactic 
involves personalising relationships with representatives of the institution. Interviewees 
provided various examples of individuals and companies creating and maintaining friendly 
associations with militsiya ofﬁcers that ranged from having regular vodka drink- ing sessions 
with militsiyamen to giving them various favours and funding militsiya.9 
 
 
The idea is that militsiya will help their friends when needed. For example, a business- 
man disclosed in the interview that his limousine rental company provided services for 
militsiya at a reduced price, which served as a form of insurance. In his own words, 
‘Militsiya call us and ask: “do you have any problems? If not, we’ll help you if there is 
anything you need in the future.” So, we give them a discount, just in case’. It was noted 
that paying or giving various favours to militsiya as a form of insurance can be quite 
expensive, yet interviewees reported that the special relationships they have developed 
with militsiya made them feel safer. 
 
 
Exploiting servility of militsiya 
A number of interviewees have pointed out boot-licking inclinations of militsiya towards 
their superiors. In the words of one respondent, ‘Towards those whom they are afraid of 
they will be humble and courteous, but towards those over whom they have power – they 
will trample them’. It appears from the ﬁndings of this study that sometimes militsiya’s 
fear of offending their superiors through mistreating actual or supposed friends of the lat- 
ter can be exploited by citizens to their advantage. 
Some examples indicate that even indirect evidence of friendship with militsiya com- 
manders may be sufﬁcient to get lenient treatment by low rank militsiya in some cases. 
One interviewee carried with him a business card of a local militsiya commander (with 
whom he was acquainted). Another interviewee, a musician, had a picture of himself and a 
local militsiya commander taken on a social occasion where his band had played, 
which he carried inside his driving licence. Every time trafﬁc militsiya stopped these 
drivers, they produced their evidence of friendships with the militsiya commanders. When 
trafﬁc militsiya saw it, they immediately began to treat these respondents with respect 
and leniency. Similarly, claiming to have connections with senior militsiya ofﬁcers was 
successfully employed by other respondents in order to avoid arrests. 
 
Pleading, appealing for sympathy, and negotiating 
Another way of getting positive outcomes in dealings with militsiya may involve being very 
persistent in nagging them. For example, one respondent found this tactic useful in obtain- 
ing permission to see her husband who was detained in an investigation isolation unit. She 
described in the interview how sitting outside the ofﬁce of an investigating ofﬁcer every 
day, all day long, for two weeks, accompanied by her young children, and begging the ofﬁ- cer 
to allow her to see her husband eventually achieved the desired result. According to this 
interviewee, her husband’s friends were also detained, but their wives were not as relentless as 
she was, so they had to wait much longer to be allowed to see their husbands. 
Militsiya frequently extort payments from people. This practice serves as a ‘tribute’ or 
an acknowledgement of who rules the street (Humphrey, 2002, pp. 143–144). Several 
interviewees mentioned that a tactic that may help to avoid extortion involves provoking 
militsiya’s sympathy. One of these respondents said that when she sells vegetables she 
has grown in the market, and militsiyamen approach her and demand money, she points 
out to them the fact that she is 75 years old, has a tiny pension, and an unemployed son 
whom she supports ﬁnancially. This interviewee claimed that this strategy was often 
effective, and militsiya left her alone. Similarly, elderly drivers reported pleading success- fully 
their status as pensioners and informing militsiya how small their pension was when they 
were faced with extortion by militsiya. Claiming to be a student or unemployed can also 
help to avoid ﬁnes for various minor law violations. 
 
 
A related strategy is to engage in negotiations with militsiya. The author observed 
drivers bargaining with militsiyamen about the size of a ﬁne. This was done while disput- ing 
the seriousness of a rule violation or its very existence. There is a well-known Russian 
practice, where a driver stopped by militsiya and accused of a violation has a choice 
between a larger ﬁne with – or a smaller ﬁne without – a receipt. The smaller ﬁne is a 
natural choice of the vast majority of drivers. Since the incident is not documented and 
no receipt is provided, the money goes directly into the pocket of the militsiya ofﬁcer. 
The precise amount of a ‘receiptless’ ﬁne appears to be open to negotiation. 
While various instances were described where positive results were achieved by 
respondents through nagging or negotiating with militsiya, it is clear that in the process 
people may have to invest a great deal of time and experience a lot of inconvenience (as in 
the case of the wife mentioned above who sat outside the militsiyaman’s ofﬁce for two 
weeks, accompanied by her young children, one of whom was a newborn baby). The 
process may be very stressful, and interviewees also admitted that begging militsiya is 
humiliating. In the words of one of them, ‘it is demeaning, but what can you do? We 
have got used to it’. 
 
 
Using inﬂuential acquaintances outside the militsiya 
It further emerges from interviews that a powerful survival tool is having the right connec- 
tions outside the militsiya. A number of respondents made references to being lucky to have 
inﬂuential acquaintances whose help was employed in various dealings with militsiya. The 
circumstances where the aid of such acquaintances was utilised included reporting a crime to 
militsiya,10 acquiring fake documents, and obtaining releases from militsiya custody. 
Particularly useful connections appear to be those with local government. Therefore, 
references to friendships with local administrators have assisted some respondents in 
stopping antisocial behaviour of drunken militsiyamen and helped others to avoid arrests. 
The potency of this ‘weapon’ is probably unsurprising, given that militsiya are closely 
linked to administrations at a local level and depend on them for funding and subsidies 
(Galeotti, 2003).11 
The survival technique based on using personal connections is very familiar to Rus- 
sians. It is rooted in blat – a system of informal networks where favours are exchanged, 
rules are bent or broken, and beneﬁts are misallocated in the expectation that some day a 
favour will be returned (Ledeneva, 1998). In Soviet times, the system operated to com- 
pensate for the shortages of goods and services. Today, blat in an evolved form is used to 
remedy various failures of Russian institutions, including the militsiya. 
The problem with this system, of course, is that not everybody has equal access to per- 
sonal networks and has connections with inﬂuential people. This makes some individuals 
and groups more vulnerable than others. Yet, it should be noted that there is research evi- 
dence suggesting that the majority of Russians have a variety of networks on which they can 
rely in most situations (Rose, 1999, 2001). In the words of an interviewee from the 
author’s study, ‘Everybody has their own inﬂuential contacts. Everybody has accumulated 
necessary connections. Ask anybody – they know someone to give money to’. 
 
 
Enlisting help of gangsters 
Organised criminal groups ﬂourish in contemporary Russia. In addition to their other 
activities, they perform many functions that once had been reserved for the state (Rawlin- 
son, 1998; Shvarts, 2003; Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2000, 2002). They may offer long-term
 
 
protection or one-off services to individuals and businesses. Some interviewees in this 
study – or people they knew – felt compelled to resort to the help of organised criminal 
groups. The examples offered by interviewees involved gangsters investigating crime, set- 
tling disputes, recovering debts, and administering punishments. 
Indeed, some respondents appeared to have more faith in the effectiveness of gang- 
sters than in the potential of militsiya to solve problems. One of them regretted that when 
her daughter was murdered, she relied on militsiya. Militsiya never found the murderer, but 
facilitated the conviction of an innocent person. The interviewee believed that if instead 
she had hired gangsters soon after the event, the real murderer would have been brought 
to justice a long time ago. At the interview, she confessed an intention to eventu- ally ﬁnd 
the murderer with the help of gangsters and said that she was saving money to pay for 
their services. 
Another interviewee described how helpful a gangster had been in helping to protect 
his son. The son was threatened with violence by a group of young men. A complaint to 
militsiya was ineffective. Luckily, the interviewee knew a gangster who had a word with the 
men. The interviewee concluded his story: ‘They were terriﬁed to see him because he is a 
member of a bandit group. After that my son had no problems. The militsiya didn’t help, 
but he did’. 
In one case the militsiya themselves referred a crime victim to gangsters. The intervie- 
wee whose expensive car had been stolen was told by the militsiya that they would not be 
able to ﬁnd it, but recommended that he get in touch with local gangsters if he wants to 
get it back. The gangsters are well informed, and for a payment they may be able to return 
the car to the owner. That is, instead of investigating a crime, militsiya advised a victim 
how to investigate it, employing the services of known criminals. 
While this study has found some evidence that gangsters may help to compensate for 
the inefﬁciency and ineptitude of militsiya, using their services clearly presents numerous 
dangers. Given that bandit groups are known to lynch suspected criminals, they challenge the 
rule of law and threaten human rights. In addition, the services of gangsters are not free, 
nor can an average person easily contact them since they do not operate openly. The 
consequence is that only those who have money and the right connections can bene- ﬁt 
from the help and protection of bandits. Even then, gangsters may only help the victim if the 
offender is not protected by powerful networks (Varese, 2001). 
 
Citizens taking law enforcement into their own hands 
Some ﬁndings suggest that citizens, confronted with the failure of militsiya to perform 
their functions, sometimes may undertake law enforcement tasks themselves. A typical 
example involved hooligans harassing young women, while militsiya ofﬁcers were standing 
nearby. According to respondents, militsiya ofﬁcers in such cases often turn away and 
pretend not to see the incident. Then ordinary citizens may intervene and repri- mand the 
hooligans for their behaviour (and sometimes the militsiya ofﬁcers as well for their 
inaction). 
Some interviewees provided examples of citizens administering punishments with 
their own hands. This happened in cases where militsiya had found insufﬁcient evidence to 
prosecute an accused (typically it was alleged that a bribe from the accused was 
instrumental in the militsiya closing the case). Such incidents of private revenge, of 
course, present serious threats to human rights. Yet, for some victims this may be the 
only way to bring offenders to justice, given the evidence that militsiya may engage in 
falsifying evidence and closing criminal cases for a payment. 
 
 
Occasional assertion of legal rights 
So far, this paper has demonstrated that citizens use a variety of techniques to compen- 
sate for the pathological policing that tends to be extra-legal in nature. One situation 
where people sometimes choose the correct legal process over informal solutions involves 
drivers who, instead of paying receiptless ﬁnes referred to above (which are routinely 
pocketed by militsiyamen), may ask for a receipt. That choice means that the amount the 
driver has to pay is signiﬁcantly bigger, and the inconvenience of going to a bank and 
having to queue there is added. It appears from interviews that this choice is most likely 
when a driver feels that the infringement they are accused of never occurred and is 
invented by militsiya. Choosing the correct legal procedure in such cases appears to be a 
form of protest against unfair accusations and is a revenge on militsiya whose expecta- 
tions of additional earnings are disappointed. Using the words of an interviewee, ‘When 
militsiya stop you, they look happy contemplating a bribe. But if you ask them for a 
receipt, it spoils their good mood immediately’. 
One interviewee gave an illustration where an appeal to legal procedures was used 
successfully against militsiya who extorted money from market traders under the pretence of 
various checks. This interviewee educated herself about the rules that militsiya have to 
observe in order to conduct the checks lawfully. Therefore, when militsiya approached 
her and demanded a payment, she pointed out to them that certain  procedural rules 
required for the checks have not been complied with. The ofﬁcers looked puzzled when 
faced with a citizen who knew her rights, but left her alone. 
This case was untypical: ﬁndings from this study indicate that most citizens do not 
attempt to appeal to the law when faced with extortion (or other unlawful behaviour) by 
militsiya. Similarly, it is very unusual for people to employ formal complaints procedures 
following violations by militsiya: no evidence of formal complaints was found in this study. As 
one interviewee explained, ‘People in Russia have no legal culture. People don’t know what 
rights they have and how to defend them. So, they seek solutions outside the law’. 
Anti-legalism is a part of Russian mentality, and the concept that legal rules can offer 
protection against abuses of power by state ofﬁcials seems rather foreign to an average 
Russian (Hendley, 1999; Kurkchiyan, 2003; Newcity, 1997). Both today’s state ofﬁcials and 
communist rulers have displayed so much disregard for legal restraints that a strong sense 
of cynicism has been created on the part of citizens about relying on legal rules for defence. 
Instead, most people search for extra-legal ways of defending themselves against abuses by 
militsiya (as well as other state ofﬁcials), as the ﬁndings of this study illustrate. 
One of the main reasons why interviewees in this study had little faith in the potency of 
legal rules and procedures to defend them against abuses of power by militsiya was their 
perception of lack of controls over – and impunity of – militsiya. It was argued that the 
militsiya was a clan institution that acted to protect its members and cover up their 
crimes. Therefore, invoking the formal procedure to complain against abuses of power 
was useless. Another belief that discouraged respondents from seeking legal defence was 
that militsiya collaborated with criminals. Respondents felt that because of the possibility of 
such collaborations attempts to use legal procedures might provoke retaliation from 
gangsters. Real-life examples were offered to support that  conviction. It was further argued 
that seeking legal protection is pointless for an ordinary person because the law in Russia 
only protects those with money and power. The perception of inequality in the 
application of law led interviewees to conclude that when dealing with militsiya, they are best 
protected not through the force of law but through personal connections, bribes, and 
various other informal methods. 
  
Conclusion 
This study has revealed a variety of adaptations developed by people in response to the 
failure of the militsiya. It was unusual for interviewees to report simple resignation and a 
conclusion that nothing can be done to protect themselves and their possessions: in the 
vast majority of cases, low expectations regarding militsiya’s ability to defend citizens 
resulted in a variety of responses substituting for the inefﬁciency of militsiya. Furthermore, the 
distrust towards, and fear of, militsiya brought about numerous strategies designed by 
citizens to minimise chances of their victimisation by ‘werewolves in epaulettes’. 
While the focus of this paper was on the militsiya, it is important to note that this is 
not the only dysfunctional institution in Russia. Adaptive strategies similar to those out- 
lined in this paper have evolved to deal with organisational failures of practically every 
state institution in today’s Russia (Rose, 1999, 2001; Shevchenko, 2001). These tech- 
niques enable people to survive in an environment characterised by instability and law- 
lessness in every aspect of social, economic, and political life. In the process, rules are 
violated and circumvented, bribes are given and favours exchanged, and considerable 
ingenuity and endurance are displayed. Having to resort to these strategies adds to the 
daily hardships experienced by an average Russian who has to invest a considerable 
amount of time, effort, and money to compensate for the failure of state institutions. 
This paper has highlighted various dangers triggered by the coping strategies utilised by 
Russians. It has been argued that informal solutions that evolved in response to the fail- ure 
of the militsiya have the potential to result in an unequal level of protection among citi- zens; 
self-defensive measures may be misused and utilised for offensive purposes; there are also 
threats to human rights. Yet there is another danger. While the survival strategies of the kind 
discussed here may help to cope with individual problems, they do nothing to challenge the 
existing system characterised by inefﬁciency and corruption within practi- cally every 
Russian public institution. One or another coping strategy may assist a person to 
compensate for dysfunctional policing (or failure of other institutions) in the case at hand, 
but this approach offers virtually no scope for resistance to – indeed, it helps to per- petuate 
– the culture of lawlessness and abuse of power by state ofﬁcials. 
 
 
Notes 
1. Crime rates before and after the collapse of communism cannot be compared so as to establish 
whether the increased fear of crime was due to the actual rise in crime. During the Soviet era 
crime statistics were not publicised and the existing data were falsiﬁed for ideological reasons 
(Butler, 1992; Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huérou, 2004). 
2. Units within the militsiya are allowed to offer ‘extra-departmental protection’ to businesses if the 
businesses enter into contracts for the provision of security services with the Extra-Depart- 
mental Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
3. Following the scandal involving the militsiyamen from the Moscow Criminal Investigation 
Department that was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the term ‘werewolves in epau- 
lettes’ became very popular in the media and everyday language: it refers to militsiya ofﬁcers who 
engage in corrupt and criminal behaviour, using their position. 
4. Unfortunately, the militsiya has very wide powers and controls a signiﬁcant sphere of an indi- 
vidual’s daily life, making it practically impossible for a person to evade dealings with it com- 
pletely. For example, the militsiya issues passports, residence permits, visas, automobile 
registrations, and various certiﬁcates ranging from drivers’ licences to work permits. 
5. For a report about abuses of migrant workers in Russia see Human Rights Watch (2009). 
6. One study found that passengers on the Moscow underground who look non-Slavic are over 
20 times more likely to be stopped by militsiya than those who look typically Russian. While the 
former make up less than 5% of all Moscow underground passengers, they account for over 
half of all people stopped by militsiya (cited in Oakley & Danﬂours, 2008, p. 42). 
  
7. Propiska is a residence permit that allows one to live and work in larger cities. It is issued by 
militsiya. 
8. Incidentally, there is evidence that terrorists in several terrorist acts had fake passports issued by 
militsiya (Skoibeda & Kots, 2005). 
9. Funding militsiya by local businesses is very common. Volkov (2002, p. 169) cites ﬁndings 
from a study of charitable donations by Petersburg private businesses that uncovered that the 
regional militsiya are, after the disabled, the second largest receiver of charity from local busi- 
ness companies. Thirty-ﬁve per cent of companies represented in the survey admitted making 
donations to the regional militsiya. 
10. This happened when interviewees felt it was unsafe to report criminal activities directly to mil- 
itsiya. Militsiya may be collaborating with the criminals in question, in which case those 
reporting the crime could be subjected to revenge. 
11. Recent reforms initiated by President Medvedev may change this. The reforms switch responsi- 
bility for the funding of the militsiya’s successor, the politsiya, from a joint central/local basis to 
a central one, which may help to weaken the dependence of the politsiya on local elites. 
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